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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
CLYDE L. BALL*
This summary is limited to cases decided in the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court of Tennessee, reported during the last year, and
dealing with some phase of that body of law which embraces' Municipal
Corporations, Counties, Officers, Elections and related topics fitting
into the general classification of Local Government Law. No attempt
has been made to consider Acts of the 1953 General Assembly which
may have affected this field, as most of the legislation in this field is
local in nature.
I. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
A. Nature of Municipal Corporation
The nature of a municipal corporation was considered by the Su-
preme Court in the case of Hamilton County v. Town of East Ridge.'
The case arose when Hamilton County sought to prevent the Town
of East Ridge, located within the county, from collecting the beer tax
which is permitted to incorporated municipalities under Chapter 37,
Section 1, of the Public Acts of 1951.2 The Town of East Ridge had
originally been chartered by Private Act of 1921, which created a
governing body of the town and granted to it those powers generally
employed for the promotion of the health, comfort and prosperity of
the citizens as a whole, and also the power to levy certain taxes and
hold property. In 1933 the charter was amended to withdraw from the
town the right to maintain a fire department and the right to exercise
certain police powers. The Court held that the amendments did not
operate to destroy the existence of the municipal corporation.
The Tennessee Court, in the early case of Nichol v. Nashville,3 dis-
cussed the power of the legislature to create municipal corporations
and stated that such corporations could be created for "the good gov-
ernment of the town, and for the promotion of the health, comfort,
and prosperity of its citizens .... -4 The power of the legislature to
amend the charter so as to limit or extend the powers of the munici-
pality is well established.5 Since some of the public powers were left
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, appointment effective
September, 1953; former Editor-in-Chief, Vanderbilt Law Review; member,
Ball & McLemore, Jackson, Tennessee.
1. 249 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1952).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1051.10 (Williams Supp. 1952).
3. 28 Tenn. 251 (1848).
4. 28 Tenn. at 264.
5. Smiddy v. Memphis, 140 Tenn. 97, 203 S.W. 512 (1918); Governor v.
McEwen, 24 Tenn. 240 (1844).
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to the corporation in the East Ridge case, it appears eminently reason-
able that the act of the legislature in withdrawing from the town some
of the powers previously delegated to it should not operate to destroy
the corporation altogether.
B. Tort Liability
Two recent cases in the Supreme Court of Tennessee have dealt with
the tort liability of municipal corporations. Both cases were decided
on demurrer, and both raised the issues of (1) when is a municipal
activity governmental as opposed to proprietary in character, and (2)
what kind of activity on the part of a municipality is sufficient to con-
stitute a nuisance.
Tennessee follows the well-established rule that a municipal cor-
poration is immune from liability for negligent torts committed by its
officers or agents while in the exercise of a governmental, as dis-
tinguished from a proprietary, function of the municipality.6 Tennessee
also recognizes the rule that this immunity does not attach, even with
respect to governmental functions, if the acts of the municipality are
such as to constitute a temporary or permanent nuisance.7
In the first of the two cases, Johnson v. City of Jackson,8 a policeman,
while riding upon a motorcycle in the process of checking city parking
meters for violations, ran into and injured the plaintiff. The declara-
tion alleged that the policeman had defective eyesight which had not
been corrected by proper glasses and that the motorcycle had a defec-
tive windshield, both of which facts were known to the city authori-
ties. The Court had no difficulty in finding that the checking of parking
meters is a governmental function. It quoted with approval the phrase
"mechanical policemen" in describing the function of the devices and
reasoned that the checking of these meters by a policeman is a part
of the function of regulating and policing traffic on the streets and is
clearly governmental in character.9
The second case, Vaughn v. City of Alcoa,10 gave the Court more
difficulty. Here the claim arose when a lifeguard at a city-owned-and-
operated swimming pool negligently allowed a young child, who was
using the pool as a paying customer, to drown. The city advertised its
6. Conelly v. Nashville, 100 Tenn. 262, 46 S.W. 565 (1898); Davis v. Knox-
ville, 90 Tenn. 599, 18 S.W. 254 (1891). For the rule generally, see 18 Mc-
QuILUN, MUN ICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.01 (3d ed. 1950); PROSSER, TORTS 1066
et seq. (1941); 38 Am. JuR., Municipal Corporations § 572 (1941).
7. Knoxville v. Lively, 141 Tenn. 22, 206 S.W. 180 (1918); Nashville v.
Mason, 137 Tenn. 169, 192 S.W. 915, L.R.A.1917D 914 (1917); Knoxville v.
Klasing, 111 Tenn. 134, 76 S.W. 814 (1903); Chattanooga v. Dowling, 101
Tenn. 342, 47 S.W. 700 (1898).
8. 250 S.W.2d I (Tenn. 1952).
9. 250 S.W.2d at 2.




pool and invited nonresidents of the city as well as residents to use it;
a fee was charged, and the city realized a profit from the operation.
In ruling that the city was immune from liability because the pool
was a governmental function, the Court recognized the confusion and
contradictions of the various jurisdictions on the subject." Although
the Court quoted from its own cases and from those of several other
jurisdictions, no very clear test or rule of determination as to character
of a function is evident in the case. The effect of the decision seems to
be to extend the classification of "governmental" to another fact situa-
tion and thus to broaden to this extent the immunity of a municipal
corporation for its torts.
The Court had little difficulty in refusing to find a nuisance in either
of the cases. In the Johnson case, the Court said that it had already
held that it was nothing more than negligence for a city to employ a
policeman known to be unsuited for his job,12 and it rejected this
ground without further comment. The Court then reasoned that, if it
were mere negligence and not a nuisance for a city knowingly to em-
ploy a policeman who was unsuited for his particular task, then it
logically followed that it was not a nuisance for a city knowingly to
use a machine which was unsuitable.
In the Vaughn case, the Court applied the rule that the city must
have done some affirmative act before it could have committed a
nuisance. The mere construction of the pool, without hidden or ap-
parent defects, would not be such an act. The Court disposed of a claim
based upon the theory of attractive nuisance by stating that as no tres-
pass was involved the doctrine could not apply. This ruling suggests
the interesting possibility that a city might owe a higher duty to a
trespasser than to a licensee.'3
C. Power to Grant Exclusive License or Franchise
.The City of Berry Hill, a suburb of Nashville with a population of
1246, adopted an ordinance providing that no more than one retail
liquor license should be issued for each 5000 persons or fraction
thereof residing within the city. One license was issued. Petitioner,
in Landman v. Kizer,14 sought to obtain the necessary certificate from
city officials to enable him to obtain a license. When his request was
refused because of the ordinance, petitioner challenged the validity
of the ordinance on the ground that it created a monopoly in violation
of Article I, Section 22, of the State Constitution. 15
11. 251 S.W.2d at 306.
12. Combs v. Elizabethtown, 161 Tenn. 363, 366, 31 S.W.2d 691 (1930).
13. This possibility is suggested in case note, 22 TENN. L. REV. 1068, 1070
(1953).
14. 255 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1953).
15. "That perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free
State, and shall not be allowed."
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In denying the petition, the Court recognized the fact that in.effect
the licensing ordinance did tend to create a monopoly. It pointed out,
however, that this effect was incidental to the real purpose of the ordi-
nance, which was to protect the health, safety and morals of the people
by stringent regulation of the liquor traffic, which traffic is not a mat-.
ter of common right, but is illegal without the grant of a special privi-
lege. The real purpose of the ordinance is a recognized, legitimate and
highly desirable, or even necessary, exercise of the police power, and
the anti-monopoly Article in the Constitution was not intended to deny
a sovereign the right to exercise necessary police power for the pro-
tection of the people.
The Landman case is unusual only in that the ordinance in question
resulted in the issuance of a single license. The Court had previously
upheld an ordinance of the City of Dyersburg which limited retai,
licenses to five.16 That decision, however, turned primarily upon the
authority of the municipality under its charter, rather than upon the
anti-monopoly issue. The Landman case followed the settled rule that
the anti-monopoly clause will not invalidate a monopoly created inci-
dental to legitimate exercise of public power for a public purpose.17
The decision is also in accord with the principle that a grant of an ex-
clusive license or franchise does not offend the anti-monopoly clause
unless the right involved is a matter of common right.'8
D. Zoning Power
The limitations upon the power of a municipal corporation to adopt
zoning regulations were considered by the Supreme Court in Henry v.
White.'9 In this case, the legislature had by private act empowered the
Knoxville city council to enact zoning regulations, subject to the :pro-
vision that all such regulations should be uniform for each class. or
kind of buildings throughout each district. The.city .council had then
adopted an ordinance which prohibited the use of any building within
a certain district for garage purposes. Later the ordinance was
amended to permit garages to be operated on United States highways
within said district. In holding that the amendment was invalid, the
Court pointed out that zoning ordinances of a municipality must .satisfy
at least three conditions: (1) the legislature must have granted to the
city the power to adopt zoning regulations; (2) the regulations, when
16. State ex rel. Veal v. Dyersburg, 184 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W.2d 11 (1946).
17. Checker Cab Co. v. Johnson City, 187 Tenn. 622, 216 S.W.2d 335 (1948);
Noe v. Morristown, 128 Tenn. 350, 161 S.W. 485, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 241 (1913);
Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S.W. 962, 48 L.R.A. 167 (1899). In the first
two cases cited, the Court held that the particular exercise of power did not
reasonably serve a proper public interest and struck down the action of the
municipalities.
18. Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478, 230 S.W.2d 971
(1950); Memphis v. Memphis Water Co., 52 Tenn. 495 (1871).
19. 250 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn. 1952).
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enacted, must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, although mere dis-
crimination between properties or detriment to individual property,
if it is rested upon some reasonable basis, will not be fatal; and (3)
the regulations must not conflict with the legislative act which grants
the power. This third condition is really a corollary of the first; that
is,.power granted by the legislature to the city must be exercised in
strict conformity with the enabling statute, else the city is actually
operating without authority. It was this third requirement which the
ordinance in question failed to meet, since to permit a garage on one
street within a district but not upon other streets in the same district,
no matter how reasonable the basis for distinction, does not make the
regulation uniform throughout the district.
Essentially the same principles had already been enunciated and
discussed in a very clear opinion in State ex rel. Lightman v. Nash-
ville.20 In the Lightman case, the zoning action of the city was struck
down because the city failed to follow the procedures outlined in the
grant of authority by the legislature. It would seem that the rule
would apply with even greater force where a substantive deviation or
conflict exists, as was true in the Henry case.
The Henry case suggests the need for extreme care in drafting
legislation delegating zoning powers to a municipality, lest even the
most reasonable ordinances or regulations fail to meet the test of con-
formity to the enabling act.
E. Liability for Back Pay to Wrongfully Suspended Employee
In a case of first impression in Tennessee, Wise v. Knoxville,21
plaintiff, a policeman in the City of Knoxville, was wrongfully sus-
-pended by the city. Upon his reinstatement pursuant to court order,
he sued the city for back salary. During the period of the suspension,
plaintiff had earned substantial income at other employment.
The. Court ruled that in the case of an employee of a municipal
corporation, as distinguished from an officer of the corporation, the
rule as to private employment applies; that is, a wrongfully discharged
employee is required to minimize his damages, and the employer is
entitled to credit outside earnings received by the employee against
the amount of back pay owed. This appears to be the first adjudication
in Tennessee on the point. Though the Court stated that the rule is
well settled,22 the decisions in other jurisdictions are conflicting, and
many of them fail to consider the distinction between employee and
officer.23 The Tennessee Court did not rationalize its ruling on this
point; however, the decisions relied upon seem to proceed upon the
20. 166 Tenn. 191, 60 S.W.2d 161 (1933).
21, 250 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1952).
22. 250 S.W.2d at 31.
23. See cases collected in Note, 150 A.L.R. 100 (1944).
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theory that the municipal employee is paid under a contractual ar-
rangement and that the rule as to mitigation of damages for ,breach
of private contract applies.
Having held that an employee cannot collect his full back pay with-
out deduction for outside earned income, the Court then stated that
the rule is different in the case of an officer of the municipality. 'In
the light of the Court's determination that the policeman in question
was an employee rather than an officer,24 this statement appears to be
dictum. However, it has already been adjudicated in Tennessee.2
II. COUNTIES
A. Application of Laws by Population Classification
In Peterson v. Grissom,26 a private act of the legislature was at-
tacked on the ground that it established an unreasonable population
classification and, therefore, violated Article XI, Section 8, of the State
Constitution.27 The act applied to counties having a population of not
less than 19,200 nor more than 19,300 according to the 1950 or any sub-
sequent federal census. The population figures made the act applicable
to Henderson County only. The act changed the system of road main-
tenance in the county and established a road commission and a position
of road supervisor to be filled by the commissioners. The Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the population classification, not because
it was inherently reasonable, but because the act affected the county
in its governmental capacity. The Court reasoned that, since the legis-
lature could properly enact laws affecting a single county in its gov-
ernmental capacity, the fact that the county to be affected was
identified by an arbitrary population classification could not invalidate
the act.
The proposition that the legislature may pass laws affecting single
counties in their governmental capacities has long been settled in Ten-
nessee.2 8 That the act affected the county in its governmental capacity
was conceded; therefore, the result reached is in accord .with estab-
lished principle.
The act was also attacked on the ground that it violated Article XI,
24. This issue is discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this summary,.
see text to note 53 infra.
25. Memphis v. Woodward, 59 Tenn. 499 (1873).
26. 250 S.W.2d 3 (Tenn. 1952).
27. "The Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for
the benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the benefit of
individuals, inconsistent with the general laws of the land; nor to pass any
law granting to any individual or individuals, rights, privileges, immunities, or
exemptions, other than such as may be, by the same law, extended to any
member of the community who may be able to bring himself within the pro-
visions of the law ......
28. Loring v. McGinness, 163 Tenn. 543, 44 S.W.2d 314 (1931); Stokes v-
Dobbins, 158 Tenn. 350, 13 S.W.2d 321 (1929).
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Section 17, of the State Constitution. This issue is discussed in a later
section of this summary.
29
A different aspect of population classification was presented in the
case of Wilson v. Williams.30 By Chapter 475, Private Acts of 1951, the
legislature made certain changes in the system of road maintenance in
-Morgan County. The act was made applicable to Morgan County by
'population classification, but it was based upon the 1940 census or any
sdbsequent census. Here the contention was that the use of the 1940
census, rather than that of 1950, made the act arbitrary, vicious and
capricious. The Court rejected this argument and held that the legis-
lature may use any standard which will clearly indicate the county
to which the act is to apply and makes such provision that other coun-
ties may come within its terms. The case is unusual in its facts in that,
for some not apparent reason, an outdated census was used, but it is no
'departure in principle from existing law in Tennessee.
31
B. Taxation -Power of Legislature to Validate County Tax
Unauthorized at Time of Enactment
In 1949 Rhea County levied a total tax of $4.27 per $100.00 valuation
of property. Of this sum, $3.42 was for special levies previously au-
thorized by the legislature. A total of $0.57 was for special levies not
authorized by the legislature, and $0.28 was for general county pur-
'poses. The general law32 limits the counties to a maximum levy of
$0.40 for general county purposes. Thus, even if $0.12 of the un-
authorized special levy were treated as a part of the permissible gen-
eral purpose levy, a remainder of $0.45 was unauthorized. By Chapter
276, Private Acts of 1951, the legislature purported to validate the 1949
tax for Rhea County. In Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Rhea County,33
complainant railroad brought suit attacking the validating act on the
grounds that it violated Article I, Section 20, of the State Constitution34
and that the legislature had no power to validate an action of a county
court which was void at the time the action was taken.
The Court admitted that $0.45 of the levy was void at the time the
tax was adopted. It rejected the contention that the validating act
violated the constitutional provision against retrospective laws on the
ground that no one has a vested interest in freedom from taxation
and that no contractual right was involved, so that the constitutional
29. See text to note 58 infra.
30. 250 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1952).
31. Hall v. State, 124 Tenn. 235, 137 S.W. 500 (1911).
32. TE-N. CODE Amx. § 1045.1 (Williams 1934).
33. 250 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. 1952).
34. "That no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations of con-
tracts, shall be made."
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inhibition did not apply.35 Since the legislature could have authorized
the county to levy such a tax in 1949, it was permissible for the legis-
lature to validate the levy in 1951.
The rule that the legislature has the power to validate laws which
it could have authorized in the first instance may well be sound as to
tax matters. However, the decision in the case offers encouragement
to county courts to exceed their taxing authority, with the prospect of
obtaining legislative validation at a subsequent time. Retroactive
taxation gives rise to much economic uncertainty, even when re-
stricted to the federal level. When it is made available to counties,
serious abuses may easily arise. It is submitted that here may be a
proper field for future constitutional change.
C. Eminent Domain - Liability of County for Additional Damages
not Anticipated by Parties at Time of Settlement
In Carter County v. Street,36 the county had condemned land for
highway purposes. A report of a jury of view was accepted by the
parties, and a consent order was entered fixing the damages. Certain
questions of construction and intent arose in the case, but the issue of
significance to local government law concerned the liability of the
county for additional damages, because the excavation and filling done
in building the highway caused slides which rendered useless an ad-
ditional acre and a half of the condemnee's land. The Court of Appeals
held that the landowner was not concluded by the order in the con-
demnation suit but was entitled to recover additional damages for the
additional acreage ruined.
The rule is established in Tennessee that all injuries necessarily inci-
dent to the taking of land in condemnation proceedings are presumed
to have been included in the assessment and award of damages, and
the landowner is precluded from making an additional recovery.
37
However, in the Carter County case, neither party had reason to an-
ticipate the additional damages, and even if their possibility had been
considered, it would have properly been rejected as speculative and
conjectural. In such a case, the rule is that additional land rendered
useless amounts to an additional taking; the proper remedy in such
case is by further proceedings in condemnation, rather than by action
of trespass, and the statute of limitations applicable to condemnation
35. Article I, Section 20, of the Constitution has been interpreted to mean
that "No retrospective law which impairs the obligation of contracts, or any
other law which impairs their obligation, shall be made." Hamilton County v.
Gerlach, 176 Tenn. 288, 292, 140 S.W.2d 1084, 1086 (1940). The validity of retro-
active taxes at the federal level is firmly established. Manhattan General
Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1935), aff'd, 297 U.S. 129,
56 Sup. Ct. 397, 80 L.Ed. 528, reheawing denied, 297 U.S. 728 (1936).
36. 252 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).




D. Constitutionality of County "Tort Claims Act"
By Chapter 253, Private Acts of 1951, certain counties, particularly
Davidson, are authorized to compensate persons damaged by torts of
county employees committed while they are performing governmental
functions of the county. The act in effect sets up the county court as
a prototype of the State Board of Claims and gives it the right to ap-
propriate county funds to compensate injured persons who would
otherwise be barred by the rule of governmental immunity. The act
does not purport to remove the cloak of immunity but simply permits
the county court, if it sees fit, to compensate the victim of the tort.
The action of the county court is final, there being no provision for
appeal or review.
The act was challenged in Griffin v. Davidson County39 as being in-
valid class legislation under Article XI, Section 8, of the State Consti-
tution.40 This contention was rejected for the reason that the act
affects the county in its governmental capacity, and therefore the class
doctrine does not apply.
4 '
The act was also attacked in the same case on the ground that it
provided for a gift or gratuity from public funds. The Court refused
to rule on this argument, because the act does not actually direct pay-
ment, but simply authorizes it, and there was no showing that a pay-
ment would actually be made. Apparently, this ground of attack is
premature and must be presented only after an actual award has been
made or authorized by the county court. However, the Court indicated
what the result of such a contest might be by stating that, if counties
could pay liability insurance premiums from public funds to cover
cases where the immunity doctrine would protect the county, then the
counties could make direct compensation to liability claimants.
E. County Trustee's Right to Charge Commission on
Special Federal School Fund
Since 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission had paid to Anderson
County's board of education about $2,000,000.00 for use in operating and
maintaining a school system at Oak Ridge. The school board turned
this money over to the county trustee as it was received, and he held it
in a special account to be disbursed for the Oak Ridge schools. Ander-
son County claimed that the trustee was entitled to collect a 1% com-
mission42 for handling this fund, and the board of education disputed
the claim. This commission, amounting to about $117,000.00, would
38. Central Realty Co. v. Chattanooga, 169 Tenn. 525, 89 S.W.2d 346 (1936).
39. 250 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1952).
40. See note 27 supra.
41. See note 28 supra.
42. Under TENi. CODE ANN. § 1621 (Williams 1934, Supp. 1952).
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inure to the benefit of the county general fund, as the trustee had al-
ready received his maximum salary under the law. The trustee, in
Larue v. Anderson County,43 interpleaded the county and the board of
education, and the Court held that the commission could not properly
be charged by the trustee.
The Court had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion on both rea-
son and authority. The funds paid by the United States to the board of
education and by the board entrusted to the trustee are not within any
of the classes of monies for which the statute provides that the trustee
may charge a fee for handling, and the Tennessee Code further pro-
vides that no county officer may demand or receive a fee except as
expressly provided by law.44 The principle which the case confirms
is that the commission of the county trustee is limited to county reve-
nue which is received and disbursed by him. Money which some other
governmental authority turns over to the county or one of its agencies
to use in making payments which otherwise the county would have
to make - that is, in a sense, intergovernmental gratuities - will not
be permitted to find its way into the county general fund by way of
the trustee's fee. The rule and the reasons therefor had already been
clearly stated by the Court in State v. Miner.
45
The county trustee filed the suit in good faith, and all parties con-
ceded that he should not have to bear the expense personally. The
board of education sought to have the county held liable for the at-
torney's fee incurred by the trustee. The Court ruled that, in the ab-
sence of authority, it could not hold a county liable for fees of
opposing counsel, even if the case were prosecuted by consent. The
particular application of the rule is new, but the principle is stated in
an early Tennessee case cited by the Court.46
F. Salaries of County Officials as Affected by Anti-Fee Law
47
In Gregory v. Trousdale County48 the plaintiff sued the county to
fix his compensation as clerk of the circuit and other courts of the
county. As the case finally reached the Supreme Court, the issue was
as to the constitutionality of certain resolutions of the Quarterly
Court of Trousdale County which purported to fix the compensation
of the clerk. The Court held, without elaboration, that the resolutions
were in conflict with the anti-fee law of the State and were therefore
void. If the legislature cannot suspend the general law for the benefit
of a particular county, it seems too clear for argument that a county
court may not do so.
43. 253 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1952).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10655 (Williams 1934).
45. 176 Tenn. 158, 138 S.W.2d 766 (1939).
46. Holtzclaw v. Hamilton County, 101 Tenn. 338, 47 S.W. 421 (1898).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10725 et seq. (Williams 1934, Supp. 1952).
48. 254 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1953).
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A wholly different problem in the same field was presented in State
v. Hobbs.49 After enactment of the anti-fee bill in 1921, several private
acts were passed affecting the pay of the Clerk and Master of Law-
rence County. Pursuant to these acts, various incumbents of the of-
fice of county judge paid to the clerk and master sums different from
the amounts which he would have received under the general law. Al-
though the declaration alleged that the private acts were unconstitu-
tional and that all concerned knew this to be true, no proceedings
seem to have been brought to have this fact adjudicated. Instead this
suit was brought to recover from the defendant the sums alleged to
have been overpaid to him.
Several procedural difficulties and the statute of limitations affect
the case in part; but the holding establishes the rule that, when money
is paid out as salary by the proper county officials under an act which
has not been declared invalid by competent authority, and where no
facts to show collusion or bad faith are specified, no action will lie to
recover the salary paid. This suggests that where a salary bill is
thought to be unconstitutional, it is imperative that action to establish
this fact be taken without delay, since county monies paid out pur-
suant to such bill may not be recoverable.
G. Compensation of County Judge for Services other than as Judge
By private act, the legislature fixed the salary of the County Judge
of Scott County for his services as financial agent and chief accounting
officer of the county. In Chambers v. Marcum,50 the validity of the
act was challenged on the ground that it suspended the general law
for the benefit of an individual in violation of Article XI, Section 8,
of the State Constitution. The general law referred to is section 771:
"For his services as financial agent, the county judge or chairman shall
receive such compensation as the county court may order .... 51
The Court ruled that this statutory provision does not fix any amount
as compensation for the financial agent, but simply authorizes the
county court to do so. It must be construed in pari materia with Code
section 10679 which provides that a county judge "is entitled, when
not otherwise stipulated, to receive five dollars per day during the
sitting of the monthly or quarterly courts, and such additional com-
pensation as the several quarterly courts may appropriate for his
services ... .,"52 The Court reasoned that the phrase "when not other-
wise stipulated" means by the legislature and that, as thus inter-
preted, it shows that the legislature contemplated that it might act.
Construing the two Code sections together, section 771 was thus held
49. 250 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn. 1952).
50. 255 S.W.2d 1.(Tenn. 1953).
51. TENN. CODE ANN. § 771 (Williams 1934).
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10679 (Williams 1934).
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to mean that the county court may fix the compensation for the
county judge when that official is serving as financial agent only in
case the legislature has not already acted; that is, the legislature has
surrendered none of its special legislation prerogatives under that
statute.
III. OFFICERS
A. Distinction between Officer and Employee
The problem of classifying an individual as an officer or as an em-
ployee of a local government has arisen in connection with two dif-
ferent legal principles in Tennessee recently. In Wise v. Knoxville,
53
plaintiff, a city policeman who had been wrongfully suspended, could
recover his lost pay without reduction for outside earnings during
the period of suspension, if he were classified as an officer of the City
of Knoxville; if he were an employee of the city, he could only re-
cover the difference between what he would have received as a
policeman and what he actually received for other employment. The
Court set out certain criteria to be used in determining the status of
an individual who holds a position with a municipality: (1) Is he
entitled to a salary for a definite term, with a right of tenure for a
definite duration, with definite emoluments and definite duties which
are fixed by statute? (2) Does he receive employee benefits, or is
he ineligible for such? (3) Can he be retired by his superiors? (4)
Does he work regular hours? (5) Does he do work assigned to him?
It will be noted that the last four tests are special applications of
some part of the first.
The, Court decided that a policeman in the City of Knoxville is an
employee and not an officer. In arriving at this result, the Court
was confronted with its earlier decision in Cornet v. Chattanooga
5 4
wherein it had held that a policeman was an officer rather than an
employee. The Court resolved this apparent conflict by stating that the
Cornet case involved the Workmen's Compensation Law and the
charter of the City of Chattanooga, neither of which was involved in
the Wise case. The result of the Cornet decision was to deny work-
men's compensation benefits to the widow of a policeman killed on
duty. If any rule of construction peculiar to the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law was involved, the Court failed to mention it at the time.
Indeed, it would seem that the theory of workmen's compensation
laws5 5 would lead to a classification of the policeman as an employee
if possible, so that the benefits of the Act might be conferred upon his
53. 250 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1952). See text to note 21 supra.
54. 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742 (1933).
55. The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed liberally in claim-
ant's favor. Brown v. Birmingham Nurseries, 173 Tenn. 343, 117 S.W.2d 739
(1938); Maxwell v. Beck, 169 Tenn. 315, 87 S.W.2d 564 (1935).
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surviving dependents. The charter of the City of Chattanooga was
referred to in only one particular in the Cornet opinion - the charater
used the term "employ" with reference to policemen. This hardly
seems to be an adequate basis for suggesting that the city charter was a
significant factor in classifying the policeman as an officer rather than
as an employee. In the Wise case, the Knoxville charter refers to
policemen as employees, and this fact was mentioned by the Court in
support of its decision that the policeman was an employee and not an
officer.
The effect of the two cases is to hold that a policeman is an em-
ployee when such classification is to his detriment, and an officer when
he would benefit from being classed as an employee. True, as the
Court pointed out, the Cornet case had already been limited in its
application, but this limitation occurred in a case5 G which was clearly
distinguishable in principle.57 It is submitted that the Wise and Cornet
cases are contrary in principle and that the Court should have ex-
pressly overruled the Cornet case instead of limiting its application
to workmen's compensation cases involving persons working' for the
City of Chattanooga.
The problem as to when an individual is an officeholder as opposed
to an employee of a county is involved in four recent Tennessee cases.
The Tennessee Constitution contains two provisions relative to filling
vacancies in county offices. Article XI, Section 17, provides: "No
county office created by the Legislature shall be filled otherwise than
by the people or the County Court." Article VII, Section 4, provides:
"The election of all officers and the filling of all vacancies not other-
wise directed or provided by this Constitution, shall be made in such
manner as the Legislature shall direct." Taken together, these two
clauses seem to require that, when the legislature creates any of nu-
merous employment positions in a county, it must provide that the
position be filled by popular election or by the county court if the po-
sition is an "office" of the county. However, if the holder of the position
is merely an employee of the county, then the legislature may direct
that he be selected in any manner it may choose.
In Peterson v. Grissom, 8 the position of road supervisor for Hen-
derson County was created by the legislature, which directed that the
supervisor be selected by the county road commission. In answer to
the contention that this act was in violation of Article XI, Section
17, the Court held that the road supervisor was an employee, not an
56. Woods v. City of LaFollette, 185 Tenn. 655, 207 S.W.2d 572 (1947).
57. Ibid. In the Woods case, the insurance contract which covered city em-
ployees specifically mentioned policemen. Since the parties were free to con-
tract as they pleased, the Court ruled that a policeman was covered by the
Workmen's Compensation Act in the particular case.
58. 250 S.W.2d 3 (Tenn. 1952).
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officer, so that the act was valid.59 In Wilson v. Williams,60 a similar
act of the legislature created the position of county road supervisor
and secretary of the county road commission, both to be filled by the
county road commission. Without elaboration, the Court ruled that
these two persons would be employees of the county. In Helton v.
State,61 a defendant convicted of a criminal offense challenged the
validity of the Hamilton County jury commission act. This act set
up a three-man jury commission in the county, the members to be
appointed rather than elected. The Court held that these commission-
ers were not county officers, but rather arms of the judiciary, similar
to a master in chancery, and might properly be selected as the legis-
lature might direct.
None of these three rulings appears sufficiently questionable to re-
quire detailed explanation. The fourth is not so clear. By Chapter
156, Private Acts of 1941, a county council-manager form of govern-
ment was established in Hamilton County. The county manager was
chosen by the council. In Ragon v. Thrasher,62 this act was attacked,
and the Court ruled that the county manager was not an officer of
the county, but was an employee. The powers, duties and prerogatives
of the county manager are not set out in the opinion, so that no tests
or standard can be derived from the case. However, if a county man-
ager is not an officer, some difficulty is suggested in identifying any
administrative position as an office. It is submitted that the Court could
render a service to county governments by setting up the criteria by
which it reaches its decisions in these cases.
B. Proceedings to Enjoin Unqualified Individual from Taking Office
The successful candidate for the office of General Sessions Judge of
Bledsoe County was only 27 years old. Under the law, the minimum
age for the officer was 30 years. Three suits were brought to enjoin
the winning candidate from assuming office and were reported to-
gether as Bickford v. Swafford.63 The first suit was brought by a
number of residents and taxpayers of the county; it was dismissed on
demurrer on the ground that the complainants had no justiciable in-
terest in the controversy. The second suit was brought by the in-
cumbent judge who, though not a cadidate in the election, sought to
hold over by reason of the disqualification of the defendant; this suit
too was dismissed. The third suit was instituted in the name of the
State on relation of the district attorney general, and in this case the
trial court granted a permanent injunction. The Supreme Court
affirmed in all three cases.
59. See text to note 26 supra.
60. 250 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1953). See text to note 30 supra.
61. 255 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1953).
62. 253 S.W.2d 31 (Tenn. 1952).
63. 253 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1952).
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It is well established in Tennessee that a private citizen cannot
maintain a suit to redress a public wrong where the complainant ,has
suffered no injury which is not common to every citizen. G4 The in-
cumbent judge did not seek to question the validity of the election
itself; therefore, the suit was not an election contest, and the in-
cumbent had no special standing to bring the suit.
Had the unqualified individual actually assumed the office, the
proper remedy would have been a proceeding under section 9336 (1)
of the Tennessee Code. This and the immediately following section
provide that such suits shall be brought in the name of the State, by
the attorney general for the district by bill in equity. Such a pro-
ceeding is in the nature of the common law proceeding of quo war-
ranto.65 The Bickford case held that the same type of proceeding is
appropriate where the individual in question has not yet assumed
the office, the difference being in the relief sought. In proceedings
under Code section 9336 (1), the aim is to remove an individual from
office; in the present proceeding, the aim was to enjoin him from
taking the office. The individual citizen suffers no special injury in
either instance; it naturally and logically follows that the proper
complaint in either case should be the State upon relation of the
district attorney general.
C. Ouster Proceedings - Right to Jury Trial
In Edwards v. State ex rel. Kimbrough, 6 ouster proceedings were
instituted against the sheriff of Polk County on the ground that the
sheriff knowingly and wilfully neglected to perform certain duties en-
joined upon him as sheriff.67 The sheriff demanded a jury, which was
denied, and judgment of ouster was pronounced by the trial judge.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.
The ouster law provides that proceedings shall be summary in
character and shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure of
courts of chancery.68 The original ouster law did not provide for jury
trial on issues of fact. In 1933 the law was amended to provide for a
jury. In 1937 the 1933 amendment was repealed without more. In
1939 the 1937 repealing act was repealed without more. Thus a jury
trial was provided and repealed, and then the repealing act was itself
repealed. The defendant argued that this reinstated the original jury
64. Jared v. Fitzgerald, 183 Tenn. 682, 195 S.W.2d 1 (1946); Patton v. Chatta-
nooga, 108 Tenn. 197, 65 S.W. 414 (1901).
65. Skelton v. Barnett, 190 Tenn. 70, 227 S.W.2d 774 (1950).
66. 250 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1952).
67. "[T] o suppress all affrays, riots, routs, unlawful assemblies, insurrections,
or other breaches of the peace .. " TFNN. CoDE ANN. § 11418 (Williams
1934).
68. TENN. CoDE ArN. §§ 1888 et seq. (Williams 1934).
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provision.69 The Court did not find it necessary to decide the point.
The Court ruled that, under the facts as shown, no reasonable per-
son could have failed to reach the conclusion that the sheriff had
knowingly and willfully failed to do his duty. In chancery courts,
where a jury is empaneled on demand of one of the parties and the
chancellor finds that there is no conflict of evidence on the issues, it
is his right and duty to withdraw the case from the jury.70 Accordingly,
if the defendant had been granted a jury, it would have become the
duty of the trial judge to withdraw the case from the jury and pro-
nounce judgment of ouster; therefore, if error was committed, it was
harmless. The trial court heard the evidence upon oral testimony
without application from either party. In view of the summary nature
of the proceedings, the Court held that this was proper for the reason
that taking evidence by deposition under chancery rules would so
delay matters as to frustrate the purpose of the act. The Court had
made a similar ruling in State ex rel. Timothy v. Howse.
7 1
Any uncertainty as to the effect of the series of repealing acts has
been eliminated by the incorporation of the right to jury trial into
the Code7 2 after the trial of this case had been completed. However,
this provision will not affect situations like the Edwards case. If an
official is so clearly remiss in the performance of his duties as to offer
no opportunity for reasonable difference of opinion, then he cannot
rely upon his appeal to a jury to save him from ouster, as the matter
may properly be withdrawn from the jury.
D. Official Bonds - Liability of Sheriff for Acts of Deputy
Several boys were riding in an automobile which was being pursued
by sheriff's deputies in an official automobile, under claim that the
boys had committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the deputies.
In the chase, the deputies fired at the car, causing it to wreck and
resulting in-the death of one of the boys. In Jones v. State for the Use
of Coffey,73 the deceased's father brought suit against the sheriff and
the surety on his official bond for the act of the deputies. The trial
court overruled defendants' demurrer, a jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff and the appellate courts affirmed. The decision is apparently
based upon the theory that the deputies were acting by virtue of their
office, although the Court indicates that liability might attach under
69. The defendant's position seems correct. If a repealing statute is itself
repealed, the first statute is thereby revived, in the absence of a contrary in-
tention expressly stated or necessarily to be implied. 50 Amvt. JuR., Statutes §
579 (1944).
70. Carpenter v. Wright, 158 Tenn. 289, 13 S.W.2d 51 (1929); Lincoln County
Bank v. Maddox, 21 Tenn. App. 648, 114 S.W.2d 821 (M.S. 1937).
71. 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S.W. 510 (1916).
72. TENN. CoDE Supp. § 1889 (1950).
73. 253 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn. 1952).
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a statute, even if the acts had been under color of their office.
74
The distinction between "by virtue of" and "under color of" office is
discussed in State ex rel. Blanchard v. Fisher.75 "By virtue of" implies
that the individual has lawful power to act. "Under color of" is a
pretense of official right to do an act made by one who has no such
right. In Ivy v. Osborne76 the Court stated that the liability of a
sheriff for acts of his deputy is controlled by common law, not by
statute, and that under the common law the sheriff and his surety
would be liable only for torts of a deputy done by virtue of his office.
The language of this case is approved in Greene v. Leeper.
7
Under the Tennessee statute,78 officers and their sureties on the
official bond are liable to any person injured by the wrongful act of
the officer done either by virtue of or under color of his office. 7 The
Court in the Jones case stated that liability of the sheriff for the acts
of his deputies done-by virtue of their office is based upon doctrines of
agency.80 It then said that under Code section 1833 the sheriff is also
liable where the deputy is acting under color of office "in certain
cases." This latter phrase is not amplified. It would seem that the
agency theory would fail in the "under color of" situations. Ratifica-
tion by the sheriff of the deputy's wrongful act would apparently be
one of the "certain cases" in which the sheriff and his surety would be
liable for the deputy's act under Code section 1833.
E. Official Bonds - Suits against Sureties for Benefit of
State and County
In Smith v. State ex rel. Thomas,81 suit was brought by the County
Judge of Weakley County against the sureties on the bond of the county
court clerk to recover an alleged shortage. The suit was brought under
Code section 1657 which provides that, if the auditors cannot collect
a shortage without suit, they shall report to the county judge, who
shall cause suit to be instituted within 90 days. If the judge fails to
bring suit within that time, the comptroller of the state treasury is
authorized to do so. A number of objections were made against the
bill, and all were overruled. The case seems to stand for several
specific rules governing such suits: (1) If the county judge fails to
74. "Liability of the Sheriff would always attach when and if the wrong
of the Deputy was committed by virtue of an official act, the Sheriff being
held responsible under the doctrine of agency. Whereas, the Sheriff and his
surety would be liable in certain cases where the Deputy was acting 'Under
color of office.' Code Section 1833." 253 S.W.2d at 742.
75. 193 Tenn. 147, 245 S.W.2d 179 (1951).
76. 152 Tenn. 470, 279 S.W. 384 (1926).
77. 193 Tenn. 153, 245 S.W.2d 181 (1951).
78. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 1833 (Williams 1934).
79. Marable v. State ex rel. Wackernie, 32 Tenn. App. 238, 222 S.W.2d 238
(M.S. 1949).
80. See note 74 supra.
81. 250 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. 1952).
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bring suit within 90 days after receiving the auditor's report, his power
to bring the suit is not thereby ended, but continues concurrently
with that of the comptroller (dictum). (2) If a shortage covers more
than one term, a bill may name the sureties for every term as defend-
ants without being multifarious. (3) The bill need not show what
amounts are due individually to the State and county. (4) The bill
need not show how much of the shortage occurred in each of several
terms. (5) The courts will not look with favor upon technical de-
fenses to such a suit.
IV. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS
A. Participation by Special School Districts in
Proceeds of Bond Issue
Under the authority of Chapter 60, Public Acts of 1911,82 William-
son County issued bonds for school purposes. The law provided that
distribution of the proceeds of county bond issues should be made to
the county and to cities within the county. In State ex rel. Barksdale
v. Wilson,8 3 it was held that a hybrid special school district, comprised
of territory partly within the town of Franklin and partly outside the
town, could not participate in the proceeds of the county bond issue.
The statute has since been amended to provide for special school
districts.
The case offers nothing particularly new or unusual. It does point
out a special danger which local government units may encounter
where they are operating under general laws which did not anticipate
the existence of the particular kind of local unit.
B. Power of Local School Board -Scope of Judicial Review
The Memphis city schools are placed by private act of the legis-
lature under the exclusive management and control of the Memphis
Board of Education, and the board is given power to employ and dis-
miss teachers. The law does not enumerate the causes for which a
teacher may be dismissed. In Hayslip v. Bondurant,84 complainant, a
teacher in the Memphis schools, filed a bill in chancery to review the
action of the board of education which rescinded her contract to
teach and dismissed her. The Court held that, under the law establish-
ing the board, the action of the board was final and not subject to
review by the Court so long as the board acted within its jurisdiction,
observed the statutory requirements and was not guilty of fraud.
In the absence of a standard in the act, the power of the board to
dismiss one of its teachers would be limited only by the requirements
82. TENN. CODE AN. §§ 2557 et seq. (Williams 1934).
83. 250 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1952).
84. 250 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1952).
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that it be reasonably exercised. As a test of reasonableness, the Court
adopted the test: "... any cause which bears a reasonable relation to
the teacher's fitness or capacity to discharge the duties of his position"
or "activities ... which have a reasonable bearing on his ability, ef-
ficiency and influence in the class room."85 In the light of all the
evidence, the Court found that the board had not exceeded its juris-
diction, that it had observed the statutory requirements and that there
was no showing of fraud, so that the action of the board should stand.
85. 250 S.W.2d at 65.
